INTRODUCTION
On November 14, 2006, the International Paper Company (IP) concluded a test bum of tire-derived fuel (TDF) at its Ticonderoga Mill facility, which is located on the shores of Lake Champlain in Ticonderoga, New York.' The test, originally scheduled to last a full two weeks, ended after only five days when IP officials determined that the addition of TDF to IP's fuel mix was economically impracticable. 2 The move capped a three-year cross-border dispute between IP and Vermont residents and officials who argued that IP's use of TDF (and its failure to install the [Vol. 9 appropriate pollution-control technology) would significantly and unjustifiably increase air pollution in Vermont. 3 The struggle between Vermont residents and IP seemed to take on a life of its own. It spawned lawsuits in both state and federal court 4 and challenges to permits granted by the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (NYDEC), which were allowed to stand by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 5 Residents of the affected area in Vermont created their own advocacy group, People for Less Pollution, to fight IP's planned test bum. 6 Even state and federal political officials entered the fray, with Vermont officials denouncing the test bum and New York officials supporting it. 7 The public debate surrounding the IP test burn quickly devolved into that familiar dialogue which pits jobs and economics against environmental safeguards. 8 ,, Unfortunately, the overly simplistic public debate fails to reflect the many technical and nuanced issues raised by [P's test bum. One issue of fundamental importance is whether the air quality detriments of burning tires are outweighed by the land use benefits of disposing an everincreasing number of discarded tires through energy-generating incineration. 9 Another basic issue involves the interplay between the specific fuel mix, the specific boiler type being used, and the emissions control technology employed on site.'" These issues, among others, though critically important to the overall debate about the wisdom of using TDF, are reserved for another day. This Note will instead focus on a more discrete topic raised by IP's specific plan to bum TDF at the Ticonderoga Mill.
In order to begin its proposed TDF test burn, [P had to comply with both state and federal laws. Insofar as state law is concerned, [P had to comply with New York's State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)."
The New York Supreme Court deferred to NYDEC's classification of the project as having no significant environmental impact and therefore requiring no further environmental review. 12 Although the SEQRA portion of the IP test bum raises significant state environmental law questions, this Note will instead focus on the federal aspect of the Ticonderoga mill continues to thrive and that they continue to provide hundreds of good paying jobs in Ticonderoga and the surrounding communities for generations to come.").
8. See Kieman, supra note 6, at 19 ("Is this one more chapter of the familiar story, one more time that the only apparent avenue for protecting threatened jobs is to compromise a public resource? In part, yes.").
9. E.g., JOEL 1. REISMAN controversy-whether NYDEC's issuance (and the EPA's tacit approval) of IP's. Title V Clean Air Act operating permits were scrutinized and granted in a legally tenable manner. Thus, this Note seeks to examine the Title V permitting process through the lens of the IP test bum controversy. Such a high profile and high stakes case study provides a unique opportunity to reevaluate the goals of the Title V program vis-A-vis its current implementation. Specifically, this Note seeks to determine whether Title V-as originally envisioned--contemplates the sort of testing that IP proposed with its two-week test bum, ultimately concluding that it does not.
Part I begins with a brief summary of the test bum controversy, focusing primarily on IP's efforts to obtain an operating permit under Title V of the Clean Air Act. Next, Part II discusses Title V, focusing on three areas: the legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990; the EPA's implementing regulations; and current implementation and practice. Part III identifies problems with the Title V permitting process. Specifically, it examines problems with IP's permit application, and the permit subsequently issued by NYDEC. This Note concludes that this type of emissions testing, while lauded by industry as responsible and diligent business activity, is actually an attempt by large-scale polluters to roll back the intended environmental gains of the Clean Air Act in the name of economic efficiency.
I. INTERNATIONAL PAPER' S TICONDEROGA MILL AND TITLE V In 1926, International Paper purchased the pulp mill in Ticonderoga, New York. 13 In 1970, the company moved to a new location-the site of the current facility-ten miles north of the old mill. 4 Since that time, IP has had a long-and some might say ignominious-history of sacrificing environmental quality for economic gain. 5 [Vol. 9
major corporation has become a familiar tale in the history of environmental regulation in the United States. Economic prosperity is pitted directly against environmental gains, resulting in an awkward debate in which the parties fail to responsively address the other side's arguments.
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The current controversy began in September 2003, when IP first requested permission from NYDEC to conduct a test burn of TDF. 7 Although IP's long-term goal involved burning TDF on a permanent basis, IP initially applied for a permit to test the use of TDF as a fuel supplement for a two-week period. 8 Early in 2004, NYDEC informed IP that it would have to submit a formal application to amend its Clean Air Act Title V permit.' [P submitted a permit application early in 2005, and after an initial determination by NYDEC that the application was incomplete, resubmitted a satisfactory application on July 6, 2005.20 After public hearings, NYDEC issued a "Draft" Title V Permit. 21 During the second round of public hearings, opponents of the draft permit filled the public hearings by presenting a laundry list of grievances about the draft permit's inadequacy. 22 The most common grievance was that if IP wants to burn 16 2005, at 2 (listing thirteen specific issues that the draft permit allegedly did not take into account, such as a failure to monitor for fine particulate matter, failure to specify the composition of TDF to be used, and failure to account for emissions of specific pollutants).
tires, it should install the most effective pollution control technology, i.e., an'electrostatic precipitator." In a surprise move, Vermont Governor Jim Douglas offered to help IP pay for an electrostatic precipitator. 24 IP rejected the offer." As Governor Douglas stated: "We offered them an olive branch, and they burned it." 26 On July 27, 2006, NYDEC issued a proposed permit to IP, which triggered a forty-five day review period during which the EPA could object to the permit. 7 The EPA did not object to IP's proposed permit, and NYDEC issued a final permit on September 20, 2006.2" The final permit was the fifth modification of IP's currently-in-force Title V operating permit.
29
This modification authorizes a two week trial and testing period during which tire-derived fuel (TDF) will be combusted in the power boiler along with number 6 fuel oil and bark/wood.... During the first week, TDF will be added in gradually increasing amounts while the boiler operators adjust the boiler to achieve optimum combustion conditions. Particulate Matter emissions will be measured (using USEPA Method 5) when the TDF feed rate reaches 1 ton per hour, then again at 2 tons per hour and again at 3 tons per hour to ensure compliance with the permit limit during this period. During the second week, extensive stack testing will be performed to characterize emissions. 3 "
As noted above, Vermont continued to object to IP's test bum. The State took its case to federal court, seeking an injunction from the -Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to allow the EPA time to consider Vermont's petition to reject the final permit. 3 The court denied Vermont's request for an injunction. 32 With all of the legal impediments out of the way, IP began burning TDF on November 7, 2006." 3 II. CLEAN AIR ACT'S TITLE V Prior to 1990, the federal government did not require air polluters to obtain an operating permit. 34 In that year, however, Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which required that the EPA develop a comprehensive operating permit program. 35 The model for the program was the Clean Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. 36 The goal of the program is simple:
[T]he permit issued under this Title is intended by the Administration to be the single document or source of all the requirements under the Act applicable to the source .... Although the Title V operating permit program may seem like an administrative formality insofar as it imposes no additional substantive requirements on polluters," many senators saw the administrative nature of Title V as significantly advancing both the government's and the public's ability to enforce requirements of the Clean Air Act. 39 At the same time as ensuring compliance with other provisions of the Clean Air Act, Title V also was intended to, among other things: make the Clean Air Act more consistent with other federal environmental statutes; increase emissions data, including developing baseline data from air pollution sources; and provide money through permit fees to fund state air pollution control programs. 40 
A. Overview of Title V' Permit Program
When Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, it required that states, the primary stewards of the Act's enforcement, 4 ' develop and implement an operating permit program. 42 The Act first required the EPA to promulgate guidelines for state implementation programs in order to give the states appropriate guidance in program development. 43 After the states submitted programs to the EPA, the Agency had one year to approve or reject the program." "As of June 1997, the EPA [Vol. 9 had approved permit programs for all 114 submissions by states, local agencies, and territories." ' 4 5
Applicability: Whether a Polluting Source Must Obtain a Title V Permit
Title V establishes the sources that must obtain an operating permit by reference to other Clean Air Act sections. 46 As a general matter, sources must obtain an operating permit if they are a "major source" subject to regulation promulgated under New Source Performance Standards (NSPS); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP); Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD); and Plan Requirements for Nonattainment Areas (NSR).
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"Major sources" are defined in the regulations as those that emit or have the "potential to emit" a certain threshold level of pollutants. 4 8 Potential to emit means the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit any air pollutant under its physical and operational design.
Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of a source to emit an air pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted, stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation is enforceable by the Administrator. 49 Thus, a polluter must obtain a Title V operating permit if it is subject to one of the Clean Air Act's other listed sections and it has the potential to emit a predetermined quantity of certain pollutants. Absent any physical or operational limitation, the potential to emit presumes that the facility is operating at full capacity, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
s . The definition of "potential to emit" has generated much controversy throughout the years. 5 In recent guidance for the printing industry, the EPA has stated that "the [potential to emit] calculation should reflect the maximum hourly usage rate times the worst-case [volatile organic compound] / [hazardous air pollutant] content times the maximum feasible hours of operation. The PTE would be reduced after consideration of any enforceable limits on emissions, such as hours of operation and material throughput. Title V requires the sources described above to submit a timely and complete application for an operating permit. 53 Operating permit applications must contain a great deal of information, including: descriptions of the facilities' products and processes; "[a]ll emissions of pollutants for which the source is major, and all emissions of regulated air pollutants"; descriptions of all emissions points; emissions rates in terms of tons per year; descriptions of fuels, fuel use, and operating schedules; descriptions of air pollution control devices and limitations on source operation. 54 Additionally, the permit application must include descriptions of all applicable requirements, test methods for determining compliance, and any other specific information necessary to implement and enforce those requirements. 55 As part of the application, sources must also submit "a compliance plan describing how the source will comply with all applicable requirements under [Title V]."" The regulations set out detailed guidance regarding the [Vol. 9
nature and scope of the compliance plan required in a permit application," as well as requiring assurances and schedules of compliance for all applicable requirements. Finally, the application must be signed by a "responsible official," certifying the "truth, accuracy, and completeness" of the application. 9 These pieces of information represent the minimum requirements for any Title V program. States may augment these requirements in their individual permit programs. 6 " Typically, states have developed their own standard application forms in order to aid polluting sources in complying with the program's requirements. 6 Once the applicant submits a Title V application to the permitting authority, that authority has sixty days to determine whether the application is complete. 62 The application will be found to be "complete" only if it contains all of the information specifically required by 40 C.F.R. § 70.5(c). 63 Such information must be "sufficient to evaluate the subject source and its application and to determine all applicable requirements." ' 
Title V Permit
The EPA estimates that roughly 17,000 industrial sources are regulated under Title V, making these operating permits a significant tool in the enforcement of federal and state air pollution programs. 65 A permit must contain essentially all of the pieces of information that the application must contain," and it is established for a fixed period of time, not to exceed five 58. Id. § 70.5(c)(8)(iii)(C). The type and extent of these compliance plans and assurances differ according to whether the source: is already in compliance with the applicable requirement; out of compliance with the requirement; and whether the requirement will become effective during the permit period. Id. 
Id. § 70.5(d).
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See Clean Air Act § 504(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) (2006).
Each permit issued under this subchapter shall include enforceable emission limitations and standards, a schedule of compliance, a requirement that the permittee submit to the permitting authority, no less often than every 6 months, the results of any required monitoring, and such other conditions as are necessary years. 67 The permit has essentially two functions, depending on who is utilizing the permit and to what end it is being used. On the one hand, a permit can be used by citizens and regulators to enforce permit provisions to which the source is not in compliance. 68 On the other hand, a permit can be used by the polluting source as a shield against prosecution for any putative regulation not contained in a validly issued permit. 69 These aspects of Title V operating permits are generally recognized as a good thing, allowing for greater certainty for all concerned. 7 " The regulations describing permit requirements do so in excruciating detail. This Note will not discuss regulations concerning compliance and monitoring, as they are not relevant to the discussion of IP's Title V Permit modification below. It is sufficient to note that the regulations require that operating permits state "[a]ny permit noncompliance constitutes a violation of the Act and is grounds for enforcement action."' Thus, if a source violates any item contained in its permit, citizens and permitting authorities may maintain an enforcement action against the polluter. 72 Additionally, "[i]t shall not be a defense for a permittee in an enforcement action that it would have been necessary to halt or reduce the permitted activity in order to maintain compliance with the conditions of this permit." Congress did give industry the benefit of an "operational flexibility" regulation. 74 The Clean Air Act requires that states include provisions in to assure compliance with applicable requirements of this chapter, including the requirements of the applicable implementation plan.
Id.
67. This system will enable the State, EPA, and the public to better determine the requirements to which the source is subject, and whether the source is meeting those requirements. Better enforcement will result for all air pollution requirements, including SIP limits, new source performance standards, hazardous air pollution requirements, and acid depositation limits. In addition, this system will benefit stationary sources by providing greater certainty as to what their pollution control obligations are. Permits will also clearly identify baseline requirements for each source, facilitating emissions trading. Id. at 3730. [Vol. 9 their implementation plans that allow sources to make internal changes as long as "the changes are not modifications under any provisions of subchapter I of this chapter and the changes do not exceed the emissions allowable under the permit (whether expressed therein as a rate of emissions or in terms of total emissions)," if the facility provides timely notice of the change. 75 Thus, the Title V permitting process, through its application requirements and the legal effect of a properly issued permit, strives to create a comprehensive document containing both an emissions inventory and a catalogue of relevant legal and operational limitations and requirements. Although operating permits contain no new substantive requirements, the value of the administrative function should not be underestimated. The increased access to detailed and accurate emissions information through the Title V program serves a valuable purpose in the form of increased government and citizen oversight. 76 After all, "[a]ccording to EPA officials, Title V was added to address existing shortfalls in compliance. 77 Additionally, it is reasonable to infer that Congress highly valued the goal of increasing compliance with the Clean Air Act through the Title V program because it provided for the self-sufficiency of the program through a discrete funding mechanism. 7 8 Congress required states, through their implementation programs, to collect fees sufficient to fund the program. 79 Congress initially set the minimum fee at $25 per ton of each regulated 75. Id. 76. See COPELAND, supra note 45, at 6 ("Incorporating applicable requirements in one document that consolidates duplicative and redundant requirements is beneficial to regulatory agencies, the public, and regulated sources."). Congress noted that this aspect of Title V would "greatly augment" state resources in enforcing the Clean Air Act. Id.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AIR POLLUTIONS: STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATIONS
Throughout the 20-year history of the current Clean Air Act, inadequate State and local agency resources have increasingly hampered pollution control efforts. The permit fees provisions of this title will ameliorate this problem by requiring sources of pollution to pay a share of the costs of state air pollution programs, including, as discussed below, the costs of issuing the permit as well as the costs of modeling, monitoring, and preparation of attainment demonstrations and regulations that form the basis for air pollution control requirements.
Id.
79. Clean Air Act § 502(b)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(3)(A).
pollutant, to be adjusted annually according the Consumer Price Index."°S ome states, however, charge fees in the $30 to $40 range."' .Yet, while Title V is often portrayed by industry as an administrative burden with costs exceeding its value, it is important to keep the costs of Title V in perspective. Total costs to industry imposed by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 reached $19.4 billion (1990 dollars) in 2000.2 At $300 million, the costs of Title V represented roughly 1.5% of total costs in 2000.3 By 2010, those costs are projected to decrease to roughly 1.1% of total costs.' While $300 million is a considerable sum, the relatively low percentage cost is a reasonable price to pay in order to achieve the express goals of Title V, namely, increased compliance with the Clean Air Act.
III. INTERNATIONAL PAPER'S TITLE V PERMIT MODIFICATION
A brief chronology of IP's permit process has been provided above and will not be repeated here." This section will discuss the arguments advanced by parties to the administrative actions and lawsuits regarding IP's Title V permit for the TDF test bum. The IP test burn presents a unique opportunity to revisit the fundamental precepts of Title V and the policies supporting them. The ultimate question that this section seeks to answer is whether Title V of the Clean Air Act envisions this manner of "testing" new processes, fuels, etc. on a temporary basis for planned permanent use.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that IP's application was not for a new permit, but for a modification (the fifth) to its current permit More specifically, EPA estimates that the average cost to a polluting source is $10,000 per year, ranging to $100,000 for larger, more complex sources. GAO, STATUS Title V treats a modification in the same manner that it treats an initial or renewal permit application. 87 Thus, lessons learned from the IP experience should be applicable to Title V licensing in general. However, as a practical matter, such temporary test bums would typically arise only in the setting of a permit modification.
A. New Source Review and Title V
The core of the argument against both IP's application for a Title V permit modification and the subsequently issued permit is that they fail to adequately consider the applicability of other programs under the Clean Air Act's New Source Review (NSR) program, specifically, the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP). 8 " If the project triggers NSR review, it would be forced to comply with the rigorous technological requirements of Title 1. 89 Thus, opponents of the test bum tried to show that it would fall within the Title I definition of "modification."
By any measure, the process involved in IP's proposal to perform a two-week test burn under a Title V permit modification was a close legal call. In such situations, the fact that a polluting source can obtain a modification to its Title V permit provides a means by which polluters can obtain what amounts to administrative, rather than substantive, review, especially when the polluter is a keystone of the local economy. 9 " The effect of this "administrative review" is to afford the polluter the appearance of legitimacy, insofar as it meets all the requirements of a valid (Title V) permitting process, while at the same time allowing the polluter to escape strict review under the substantive programs that may otherwise apply.
application. Vermont Petition, supra note 5, at 3-4. However, IP's dual permit applications, while not the epitome of voluntary regulatory compliance, do seem legitimate, at least to the extent that a source may keep operating with an expired permit so long as a valid and timely renewal application has been submitted. 40 C. If we lost this mill, we'll lose our business, too. We've been conducting a wasteful energy policy the last 30 years. That's why it has to go to a [tire-derived fuel] policy."
The manner in which it does so is complex. As stated above, the Clean Air Act requires that state Title V permitting programs incorporate an "operational flexibility" provision. 9 This provision allows polluters the flexibility to make minor changes in operating methods while remaining under the umbrella of the original permit. 92 Provisions also are included for administrative permit amendments and permit modifications. 93 These various methods of amending operating plans permitted in the original action all provide industry with operational flexibility by requiring incrementally more review as the nature of the modification increases. 94 This flexibility, however, can be a double-edged sword. While it rightfully allows businesses the flexibility to compete and adapt to current circumstances, it can also be abused. Such an abuse would involve a company that is permitted (literally) to bypass the substantive requirements of a Title I program because it was able to categorize a modified activity as "major" for one aspect and not "major" for another.
In the case of IP's test burn, NYDEC explained its decision to issue the Title V permit modification to IP in a Responsiveness Summary. 95 [Vol. 9
method of operation at a facility which is of a permanent nature and which results in a threshold increase in emissions of specified pollutants." 98 Interestingly, NYDEC's definition of modification distorts somewhat the meaning of the regulations cited, at least to the extent that there is no mention of the word "permanent" in the regulations." The result of these initial classifications is that the polluting source triggers Title V review, but avoids Title I review. As a general matter, this is not an unsurprising result. Not every Title V permit modification should undergo a comprehensive Title I NSR review. In the case of IP's test burn, however, these initial classifications may have led to perverse results. The controversy surrounding the definition of "modification" in the NSR program is now almost legendary.' 00 A classic example of this debate is a recent case decided by the D.C. Circuit, which rejected an attempt by the EPA to exempt "the replacement of components with identical or functionally equivalent components that do not exceed 20% of the replacement value of the process unit and does not change its basic design parameters."' 0 ' The court focused on a couple of key aspects of the definition, including the fact that the EPA's rule neglected to account for emissions increases for those projects under the 20 % cap.' 0 2 "Indeed, the EPA's interpretation would produce a 'strange,' if not an 'indeterminate,' result: a law intended to limit increases in air pollution would allow sources operating below applicable emission limits to increase significantly the pollution they emit without government review.' 0 3
The logic used by the court in New York v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency echoes the arguments made by the State of Vermont in opposition to the IP test bum."° Vermont argued that IP should not be allowed to perform the test bum because not only was it a "modification," the simple fact that it increased emissions merited substantive review under the Clean Air Act's definition of the term.°5 Quoting the EPA's own language, Vermont argued:
Any other construction of the statute would turn the preconstruction permitting program* on its head and would allow sources to construct (modify) without a permit while they wait to see if it would be proven that emissions would increase.
Clearly Congress did not intend such an outcome, which would eviscerate the preconstruction dimension of the program.' 06 Vermont went on to argue that IP should provide the permitting authority (NYDEC) with projections and estimates of emissions from the use of TDF as a fuel, rather than test TDF on a temporary basis to assess the level of pollution. 0 7 Vermont also argued that NYDEC should not allow IP to apply for a temporary test bum permit when its stated plans involved burning TDF on a permanent basis. ' Thus, Vermont's arguments, both legal and political, sought to require more of IP than simple assurances that it would comply with the terms of its currently issued permit. Neither the NYDEC, EPA, nor state and federal courts agreed with this assessment. 0 9 Although none say as much, the sense throughout the decisions by these agencies is that the project is too small to merit substantial Title I review." 0 The NYDEC saw the benefits in the permit modification, on the other hand, as significant."' Importantly, the test bum is expected to provide valuable information with respect to: (1) whether the power boiler can handle TDF under its current configuration; (2) whether the use of TDF will require the installation of additional pollution control measures or equipment; (3) the maximum feed rate at which the boiler can bum TDF without causing an exceedance of applicable emission limits or violating air quality standards; and (4) the type and quantity of pollutants that will be emitted as a result of including TDF in the fuel mix." 2 Although these goals are laudable when viewed in isolation, the way in which NYDEC used them allowed the polluting source to modify its operations in the hopes that a new permit would not be needed." ' With the unclear state of the law regarding the term "modification," it is desirable for industry and permitting authorities to avoid the issue altogether. In the case at hand, NYDEC determined that this modification was significant enough to classify it as a "major project" for administrative purposes, yet it did not rise to the level of "modification" under the Clean Air Act. 14 These classifications allowed IP to proceed with its test burn while avoiding the technological requirements, which likely would have required an expensive electrostatic precipitator. Of course, it is perfectly rational for different Clean Air Act programs to be triggered by specific circumstances. However, in the case at hand, the very existence of the Title V operating permit regime allowed IP the opportunity to undergo a purely administrative review, thereby gaining the legitimacy afforded by the administrative process, while avoiding a significant inquiry into different technological choices that could significantly decrease emissions. As will be noted in the next section, this decision goes against the intent of the Clean Air Act and sound environmental policy.
B. Initial Classifications Lead to Poor Procedural Choices
The abovementioned arguments are not the extent of the objections that the State of Vermont and citizens groups raised with regard to the IP test bum. However, they were the most emphasized and most repeated arguments advanced by opponents of the test bum. It is important now to recall the policy reasons supporting the Clean Air Act's passage and its subsequent amendments, as well as EPA and court guidance in implementation of the Act. permit, the applicable implementation plan, or any federal requirement under the Act. Such a relaxation is allowed only if the applicant demonstrates that the relaxation is consistent with any attainment demonstration, progress requirement, or new source permit requirement, and does not interfere with any other requirement under the Act. The applicant must also demonstrate that the existing limitation is not approprite [sic] because changes occurred at the source, new information became available, the existing limitation resulted from a mistake, or the permittee demonstrates, in accordance with procedures prescribed by EPA, that it is unable to achieve the emissions limitation notwithstanding the proper installation, operation, and testing of all required controls. 115 This language from the Senate Report to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 clearly shows that Congress intended air regulation in the United States to be of a forward-moving character. Once permitting schemes were established and sources received their initial permits, Congress generally intended that regulations would be revised to become more strict, and that as a market for pollution reducing technology grew, overall pollution would decrease. Thus, in the language quoted above, Congress stated that permit conditions should not be relaxed unless pursuant to some kind of exigent circumstance.
To be clear, in IP's situation, the NYDEC was not relaxing any permit conditions and IP's new permit required that it remain within its current emissions limitations." 6 However, despite the rhetoric, IP's test bum had essentially one goal-to see how much TDF the company could bum before it reached the maximum allowable under the company's current Title I and V permits. In IP's case, that is not an insignificant amount." 7 Thus, IP's action, as sanctioned by the NYDEC through the Title V permitting scheme, has the overall effect of increasing actual air pollution largely because it might result in a costs savings to the industry.
The company complied with the process prescribed by the Act and the permitting authority found that "it [was] both appropriate and necessary for IP to conduct a test bum prior to submitting any application for a permanent permit modification."" ' 8 However, one need only play out the alternative scenario to see what is wrong with using the Title V permitting process to turn communities into what is essentially a laboratory for large-scale polluters intent on profit maximization. If IP had found a way to burn enough fuel to make the endeavor economically viable, while at the same time remaining within its current emissions limitations, NYDEC would have effectively been forced to grant an application for permanent use of TDF. This result would have two problems. First, it would likely produce a relaxed permitting regime when IP applies to burn TDF on a permanent basis. Second, it would yield an overall increase in net emissions.
The problem with both of these results is plain to see. As stated numerous times in discussions about the Clean Air Act's requirements, the overall goal of the Act is to reduce the amount of pollution in the air. Allowing a polluting source to increase its overall emissions limitations through an administrative permitting system does not achieve the goals of increasing compliance with the Act. Rather, it simply waters down those requirements already in existence. Additionally, if IP were to return to NYDEC with successful results from its test burn ("success" being measured in terms of pollution maximization under the current permit), NYDEC would have little, if any, choice but to approve the project. After all, one of the reasons NYDEC approved the test burn was to determine "whether the use of TDF will require the installation of additional pollution control measures or equipment." ' ' However, determining what type of pollution control equipment should be based on the permitting regimes of Title I and Title V, not the results of a test burn. Thus, the risk of bootstrapping the permanent TDF permit off of the test burn is both very real and very dangerous.
CONCLUSION
This Note has discussed the IP test burn as a case study under Title V of the Clean Air Act. While acknowledging that this is but one example of a widespread program, its high-profile nature serves to isolate and highlight problems with the current system. This Note concludes that Title V, as an administrative permitting scheme, can actually undercut the effectiveness of the substantive Title I programs. It does so by providing the industry with the appearance of legitimacy by virtue of the fact that a government agency 
